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IN THE
SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
---0000000---

DIVERSIFIED GENERAL CORPORATION, )
)
a Utah Corporation,
)

Plaintiff and Appellant, )
)

vs.

)

CASE No. 15462

)

WHITE BARN GOLF COURSE, INC., a
)
Utah Corporation, KEITH B. DOWNS,)
ALBERT SANONE, A OK LANDS INCOR- )
POPATED, a Utah Corporation, and )
JOHN DOES, 1 Through 8 inclusive.)
)

Defendants and Respondents.)

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

NATURE OF CASE
Plaintiff, Diversified General Corporation ("DGC"), brought
this action to recover the balance of a "finde:;:-'s" fee to which
it_deems
itself entitled by _the
terms..... and
provisions of a
_ ... _....
_ _ _....,_ •"
...
....._,¥~-

~

,~~

written and sl1:bseq_u_ei:it _c;iril,~ __c;9r~_~!]~.pt with Defendant White Barn
Golf Course, Inc.

("White Barn") , for having found a purchaser

for certain real property owned and offered for sale by White
Barn.
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment which
was subsequently argued to and heard by the court.

Summary

judgment was awarded in favor of Defendants on the grounds
that one who undertakes for a fee to secure a purchaser for
property belonging to another comes within the purview of
the Real Estate Broker's Statute, 7A UTAH CODE ANN. §61-2-1
et seq.

(1953), which precludes an action for recovery of

compensation by one not licensed as a real estate broker or
salesman.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
DGC seeks an order reversing the decision of the lower
court and setting aside summary judgment.
FACTS
, On January 6, 1976, a "Finder's Agreement"

("Agreement")

was executed b_::_t,,w~~?-!)~C:,:....an<L Yi.hi-.t.e __ Barn, whereby DGC was
given the right to find a buyer for White Barn's golf course
and condominium development.

In the event that DGC were

able to find a buyer and the sale were consummated, White
Barn agreed to pay to DGC l_~::.Y~ % of th:__ =~~-es I2I'.~~e and
convey a condominium to DGC.

The Agreement sp~~~~ically

stated that no services other than those of a finder were to
be :rendered by DGC (Record at 7-8).

Subsequent to the Agree-

ment, DGC found a potential Buyer and introduced him to a
White Barn representative.

--··

DGC did not participate in the

-2-
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e~~~~J~~-5-al_e~ _negc:,~f~~i..:?,!,lS, 1:;.~.E. ~n... ~he__,BJ;:_eJlj!.f~t~f sales
documents and was not present at the closing (Record at 32).
...

----·-·-·--

,.,

-

••

,.

_(,

.k_-'2,

:;...

, .....

'.

Prior to __:h_:.~<;:,,l_c:_s,ing, however, D$ and Whi_t;'=.~.?-~ ~y

r...,---.. . . . .

agreed
that DGC would not receive the condominium unit and
,__
_,,._,,.,--•-~r

'1-

'' ·~•o•v

......__..,,_.._

'','.-t•

•

_

>

<'

_..:,.~~.,.J.!.l,• .......

woi:.:~ re~:_~ ve as its f,ee the amo_u11t 9f fl,50 f 00,,0. O.R..i.~. op].y.

·---

After the closing DGC agreed to the payment of its fee
~~----------~-..........

in
a down
which
,.,,....--"'installments,
............--·. with
____
__,____ . . ,_._payment
_____-.__=_ . . . '""' . .of $35,000.00,
4-...----~

~

~

down pa_yr,ne~~ w;;i._s_Jl2ld an:Q.....r.E2~~iY.~<t... l~.Y.. Dg~, (Record at 3) .
However, White Barn failed to pay the balance of the fee,
and on March 28, 1977, DGC filed a ...C::£5l.J~~nt to recover the

----..........,.------

---.-..~

balance of $115,000.00.

~.~

On June 9, 1977, the Defendants moved

the lu...,er court for surrunary judgment on the grounds that DGC's
~·----~,,...,.,

,_

... ..,..,,..,,,_,,,,..,...,.-,,.,_..,, ..

activities in finding a buyer were those of a real estate
broker or salesman, that DGC was not a licensed
broker or sales""":'""· --~"""'4'<r·----.....:

man, and therefore, could not lawfully

recov~r

a

f,~n~~?:·,.'.,;.;~-~e

~----"~~

(Record at 28-30).
on June 21, 1977.

The motion was argued before the lower court
On August 30, 1977, the court, by memorandum

decision (Record at 39-41) granted the motion for summary judgment, and summary judgment was entered in favor of Defendants
on September 26, 1977 (Record at 48).

Plaintiff thereafter

filed this appeal on October 6, 1977.

ARGUMENT
The issue raised by this appeal, and narrowly drawn by
the lower court's memorandum decision is simply whether the
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real estate broker's statutes should apply to one who merely
introduces a potential buyer to an owner and seller of real
property.

POINT I
UTAH CASE LAW DISTINGUISHJ:::S BET\IJEEN A
REAL ESTATE BROKER OR SALESMAN AND A
FINDER AND ESTJrnLISHES THAT Tl!E MERE
INTRODUCTION OF A POTENTIAL BUYER TO
A SELLER OF REAL PROPERTY DOES NOT OFFEND THE PUBLIC POLICY BEHIND NOR VIOLATE THE REAL LSTATE BROKER'S STATUTES.
The pertinent parts of the applicable statutes which
Defendant claim require a finder to be licensed and which
prohibit an action to recover compensation by one not so
licensed are as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, copartnership or corporation to engage in the business,
act in the capacity of, advertise or assurne to
act as a real estate broker or a real estate
salesman within this state without first obtaining a license under the provisions of this chapter.
7A UTAH CODE ANN. §61-2-1

(1953).

The term "real estate broker" within the meaning
of this chapter shall include all persons, partnerships, associations· and corporations, foreign
and domestic, who for another and for a fee, commission or other valuable consideration, or who
{n the expectation or upon the promise of receiving or collecting a fee, commission or other

-4-
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valuable consideration, . . . assists or directs
in· the - prcict:ir ing of prospects or·-the ~riegoHaflOns
or closing of: ariy.fraiisacfion which 'does· 0r-·"15,··
c~culated to result ih- the sale, exchange"';-!easing or rentin9 of any real estate . . . :··' - · -'·
.

'•1·•·-·

,,_ .,_,

7A UTAH CODE ANN. §61-2-2 (1953).
(a)
No person, partnership, association or corporation shall bring or maintain an action in any
court of this staterortte"-recovery~or commission
a fee, or compensation· ·r&- CJ.1'1'{'-acf d'one ·oi'-·sef\rice'
rendered the doing or rendering of which is prohibited under the provisions of this act to other
than licensed real estate brokers, unless such person was duly licensed hereunder as
estate
broker at the time ot'"tJie-·aorng of such act or the
rendering of such service.

a'real

7A UTAH CODE ANN. §61-2-18 (1953).
A.

Andersen v. Johnson.
There are principally two Utah cases dealing with

and resolving the issue raised by this appeal.

The first

chronologically is Andersen v. Johnson, 108 Utah 417, 160
P.2d 725

(1945), in which the plaintiff entered into an

oral agreement with defendant by which plaintiff obligated
..
'"""•~

himself to assist defendant, who was a licensed real
estate broker, in securing listings of real estate for sale
' -. '"-'•

by defendant.

N:.J-.:~.-~·"'"·

.,

---

- . ·'-

In consideration of plain_t_Lf_t'~. services,
.. --~··

"-"

...., -- .. --..

-·

defendant promised to give to plaintiff a full. one-third
- - -

-

•.•

-

-

--

as a real estate broker or salesman.

-5-
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Plaintiff subsequently
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in~~~~-ed defendant to the owner of certain real prop:_rty
and defendant was thereby enabled to list and sell said
property, earning a corruuission which, however, he refused

...

to share with plaintiff as required by their agreement.
Plaintiff brought an action to recover his portion of
the commission and defendant responded with a demurrer.
The substance of the demurrer was that plaintiff, by
assisting defendant to procure listings, had acted and
should be classified as a real estate broker in accordance with the then statutory definition of the same,
set forth in UTAH CODE ANN. §82-2-2 (1943)

[now UTAH CODE

ANN. §61-2-2 (1953)], which reads in pertinent part as
follows:
The term "real estate broker" within the meaning of this chapter shall include all persons . .
who with the intention or in the expectation or
upon the promise of receiving or collecting a fee,
commission, or other valuable consideration . . .
assists or directs in the procuring of prospects
. calculated to result in the sale . . . of
any real estate.
(emphasis added)
The district court agreed with defendant's proposi-

tion that plaintiff's assistance in securing listings
made plaintiff a real estate broker, and since plaintiff
was not licensed as such, he could not recover any portion
of defendant's commission.
The supreme court, obviously uneasy about nullifying
__,,_--- ..... ,,_

.

-6-
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an otherwise valid and bona fide agreement, reversed and
...

__

.,,.,_., ._,,.,..,....,_ ....

~·········-·~- _ __.,._._.,.~~.._,-.-

.......

~

remanded on the grounds that the term "prospects" as used

------..

......._.._._,..,.... ~,~--~,,.,.-------

in UTAH CODE ANN. §82-2-2 (1943), supra, referred only to

_

those interested in purchasing realty and not to those
_______ --- ..,.,..._,,,._.,
_......,..
wishing to sell:
,

---·--~-,,~~-------~

-·~----~-.,,._-~

~

While it is necessary to secure listings, the
term "real estate prospect" refers to one interested
in the purchase of realty . .~ r~fi!r
toone~ffom wh.offi'you. . might secure-a Hsting.
- •.. -~ .. ...,-.,. ''" ' •.

-:t.~_.._._......_.__.~

......,.,,...,__....__,,. ........_,_.~

Andersen v. Johnson, supra, at 729.

-

Justice Wade, in recognition of the awkwardness of
the majority's dictum definition of "prospects" as patential purchasers but not sellers of realty, concurred in
the result

but offered more tenable and non-discriminatory

reasoning for it:
I cannot agree that the phrase 'assists or directs
in the procuring of prospects' in Sec. 82-2-2, U.C.A.
1943, defining 'Real Estate Broker' is limited to
'one interested in the purchase of realty or in obtaining a lease of its use and does not refer to
one from whom you might secure a listing' as stated
in the prevailing opinion.
I think the word 'prospect' includes the prospective seller of property
as well as the prospective buyer.
Andersen v. Johnson, supra, at 729 (Wade, J. concurring)
Justice Wade then furnished a public policy basis for
excluding appellant from the coverage of UTAH CODE ANN.
§82-2-2 (1943), supra:
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Whereas a literal reading of Sec. 82-2-2 would
include anyone not specifically exempted therein
who, for compensation, was in any manner connect~d
with a transaction involving real estate, as for
instance a stenographer in a real estate broker's
office who con~a~ted people desiring a listing,
I am of the opinion that such is not the intent or
meaning of this section. A reading of the statutes
regulating real estate brokers makes it apparent
they were enacted for the benefit of the public to
protect them from dishonest and unscrupulous real
estate agents.
Such protection of the public is
not needed from the casual or remote influence of
a stenographer or of a person who may wish to deal
with him.
Neither the stenographer ~or the man ~o
introduces the broker in the examples I have mentioned are active participants in any contract affecting real estate or any liability of the persons
entering into such contracts or listings. The
dealings which the statutes aim to protect the public in are those which result in legal liabilities
between the parties.
Nothing the stenographer or
the man who introduces the real estate broker does,
has that effect. This is true even though the real
estate broker contracts to pay the man who introduces
him a part of his commission in the event he makes a
sale.
(emphasis added)
Andersen v. Johnson, supra, at 729-30 (Wade, J. concurring) .
Justice Wade's resolution of the difficulty is

super~r

to that of the majority in that it does away with the
meaningless distinction between potential buyers and
sellers,

provides a more realistic and rational public

policy basis for sustaining an agreement like the one in
Andersen and avoids the harsh results and strained

reaso~

ling which frequently follow the bad law of hard cases.
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B.

Chase v. Morgan.
In Chase v. Morgan, 9 Utah 2d 125, 339 P.2d 1019

(1959), the second of the two principal Utah cases, the
-~_........,...........,- .. ,,,.._,.._.,~_.-._,.,-, ___ ,

"vo·"'~'

~'"''-''

·; ,r.

supreme court again confronted the real estate broker's
statutes and this time the issue was whether appellant,
who had supplied respondent with prospective purchasers
.......,. - .-.w-

,,J•

_

-,,._ .,.-_,,..,,,,..,.-·,

--«1 C-"'•L.....•,.,,.,

·--.._~_..,---

for its oil and gas leases, was precluded by the statutes
..,.,, ...-.,c,_,_., ......

from recovering his agreed-upon compensation.

--

Justice Wade, this time writing the majority opinion, coneluded that ---·
the

_,,__..~

ap~ellant

__ ... __ , .•.:~ ,,,_ ....... '

had violated
the statutes
..
......
...

.-,-..-·--~;i.o-.-,,,,,

-.~

beca~se

~.......-P-

agreement with respondent involved more than the mere
-~-~~~·~·_,,,,.-.~v~,.~.-,_,,

,

••,,;•J;"'l.u

_.,,,.."i,~~~~).,.,~1:.-.CF>l':J

introduction of a buyer; it authorized appellant to make
the sales himself:
It is clear from the above evidence that
appellant and his associates were authorized
to sell or negotiate the sale of the leases
involved. Such an agreement contemplated more
than the mere finding or introduction of a
buyer and clearly was the sort of activity embraced within the definition of "Real estate
broker" quoted above.
(Emphasis added) .
Chase v. Morgan, supra, at 1021.
Consistent with his concurring opinion in Andersen,
Justice Wade implies clearly in Chase that the mere finding
or introduction of a buyer or seller is not enough to make
one a broker because public policy does not require it.
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his

His reason for holding that appellant in _chase had
the statutes was that appellant had been

o

violate/, ,

t'

~.

i.e., he was authorized to go beyond mere finding and i~
traducing and actually sell or negotiate the sale of
respondent's leases.

Clearly, such sales or negotiations,

unlike a mere finding or introducing, would give rise~
legal liabilities, and public policy would therefore ma~
date that appellant and other similarly situated be
licensed and regulated for the protection of their pri~
cipals, and those dealing with them.

To again quote

Justice Wade:
The dealings which the statutes aim .to
prot1tef thci__public ..in. µ;i:;_e. those which result in legal liabilities between'''tlie'~
par Hes-:·-~---··- "--·
Andersen v. Johnson, supra, at 730.
As found and stated by the lower court in its mernorandwn
decision, the case at bar involves the mere contacting and
introducing of a potential buyer and nothing more (Record at
39).

Indeed, the written agreement executed by appellant

a~

respondent in the case at bar specified that no other services than those of a "finder" were to be rendered by appellant
(Record at 8), which makes the case at bar quite distinguis~
able from Chase.
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A consideration of its facts shows the case at bar to be
very similar to Andersen, the only pertinent distinction being
that in Andersen appellant introduced a prospective seller
and in the case at bar appellant introduced a buyer.

In neither

-·"

case did appellant presume to sell or negotiate a sale without

.......

~

---~~-~-~~~

,-

..

--~

a broker's license, in neither case did appellant agree or
receive authorization to sell or negotiate a sale, and it
should follow that in neither case will appellant be denied
recovery of compensation bargained for and earned.

POINT II
UTAH LAW AS HERETOFORE DISCUSSED IS CONSISTENT WITH THAT OF CALIFORNIA WHICH HAS
LONG DISTINGUISHED BETWEEN REAL ESTATE
BROKERS OR SALESMEN AND FINDERS.

-

California courts have long recognized the important
.. ~~.: ...... ~... ,. ... __..~~

distinction between real estate brokers or salesmen and finders
an..::,_}2.::_ve, accordingly, excluded

finder_;;;_tt~~.~e;?'.¥.9..,Veraqe

of

the California statutes defining real estate brokers, even
~--------, ...... ,,._111.::h.~~

though such statutes define brokers to include those who
solicit for prospective purchasers.

Tyrone v. Kelley, 106

Cal. Rptr. 761, 507 P. 2d 65, at 70 n. 5 (1973).
!The court in Tyrone speaks very cogently about the distinction between brokers and finders and the policy reasons
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for recognizing it:
Defendants urge that Tyrone is not entitled to
a judgment against them on the agreement since he
performed the services of a real estate broker in
California, but was not licensed as a broker in
California. They maintain that his recovery is
barred under the provisions of section 10136 of
the Business and Professions Code and related sections.
Numerous cases have held that one who simply finds
and introduces two parties to a real estate transaction need not be licensed as a real estate broker.
Such an intermediary or middleman is protected by
the finder's exception to the real estate licensing
laws, an exception first established in Shaffer v.
Beinhorn (1923) 190 Cal. 569, 573-574, 213 P. 960.
In that case, this court held that a person who
contracted to introduce a seller to a prospective
purchaser did not act as a broker but as a finder.
Many subsequent cases have recognized the exception.
(See, e.g., Batson v. Strehlow, 68 Cal.2d 662, 669
68 Cal.Rptr. 589, 441 P.2d 101; Davis v. Chipman,
210 Cal.609 619-620, 293 P.40; Zappas v. King Williams
Press, Inc., 10 Cal.App.3d 768, 772-773, 89 Cal.Rptr.
307; Hasckian v. Krotz, 268 Cal.App.2d 311, 319324, 74 Cal.Rptr. 410; Porter v. Cirod, Inc., 242
Cal.App.2d 761, 762-763, 51 Cal.Rptr. 784; Evans v.
Riverside Internat. Raceway, 237 Cal.App.2d 666,
675-677, 47 Cal.Rptr. 187; Spielberg v. Granz, 185
Cal.App.2d 283, 290-291, 8 Cal.Rptr. 190; Palmer v.
Wahler, 133 Cal.App.2d 705, 708-711, 285 P.2d 8;
Freeman v. Jergins, 125 Cal.~pp.2d 536, 546-551,
271 P.2d 210; Crofoot v. Spivak, 113 Cal.App.2d 146,
147-148, 248 P.2d 45; Rhode v. Bartholomew, 94 Cal.App.2d 272, 279-282, 210 P.2d 768.)
The finder is a person whose employment is limited
to bringing the parties together so that they may
negotiate their own contract, and the distinction
between the finder and the broker frequently turns
upon whether the intermediary has been invested wi~
authority to participate in negotiations.
(See, e.g.,
Batson v. Strehlow, supra, 68 Cal. 2d 662, 669, 68 Cal.·
Rptr. 589, 441 P.2d 1001; Davis v. Chipman, supra, 210
Cal.609, 619-620, 293 P.40.)

-12-
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I

One who merely introduces two parties to a real
estate transaction, whether or not he solicits those
persons, does not need to be as knowledgeable about
real estate transactions as a licensed broker, unless, of course, he participates in the negotiations
Unless he enters into the negotiation of
the transaction or other activities beyond introduction, he need not be well versed in real estate law
or in real estate economics and appraising.

It is true that the finder's exception presents
a seeming anomaly in our law. In general, an unli( censed individual may recover an agreed compensation
I where he merely finds a buyer, seller, lender, or
1 borrower, but if in addition to finding such person
1 he goes further and helps to conclude the transaction by taking part in negotiating the details of
the transaction, compromising or composing differences between the parties, by way of example, he may
not recover the agreed compensation.

J

Nevertheless, when viewed in the light of the
competing public policies the finder's exception
is not anomalous.
Fundamental to our law is the
b~s~c._pr_in~J-~JEL .tha.t.,~€9.P.~_,.,..sli<S'illr'..fu:rTcirmt.heir
contracts_,_ and w~en .:t~~y J~.f.$.~h~jJ:_agreem!i,ij:\iS,
action should ord~n-~lU.1.Y: ...J..u~...t9-.e.~_r1tractual
duties.
6n -the..other hand, the promoIT~e
t~ncy and integrity in those called upon by the public to perform complex duties involving trust is a
salutury purpose, and the policy underlying the licensing statutes must be given full effect. Neither
considerations of co~J;-~_r1gLJ19.f_~_tr.ll§ii.--R:r.e of
lniportance'-where the undertaki.llS,.j..§__.merely tQ. seek
o~"--_l.9_s;~i}.'e~. f i1.1d j:\DC!.2:!Lt..G2PJJ.Q.fiU~.. .£.~£.t~~l.~~,
b~r:o;:'':r , __ _o_;r _l_~i:i?e:s_~_!;o ..~s cou~.~~.~_,!...£.r w~e

~?.~t~i~~l~Ee_~ 9 r~C?itl~ti1.~1fa~~~-· ~~~~~re

the promise to pay a f1naer 1 s tee we give effect to
the policy of enforcement of contracts in cases
where the policy underlying the licensing statute
does not directly apply.
It is for the Legislature,
not this court, to determine whether the finder's
exception should be terminated.
Tyrone v. Kelley, supra, at 69-70 and 72.
The California court's approach to the broker-finder issue
is an cnl i<1htened one which recognizes and preserves the
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important differences between the two and prevents those w~
bargain for and receive valuable finder's services from
avoiding just payment for the same.

CONCLUSION

The mere finding and introduction of a buyer is not an
activity or dealing which results in legal liabilities between the buyer and seller of realty and thus does not invalve the dangers sought to be protected against by the

Ut~

Real Estate Brokers Act; therefore, public policy does not
require that appellant as a finder only be licensed in

ord~

to recover a commission in good faith contracted for, honestly
earned and not otherwise disputed.

The Act should not be read

to include such activity or dealing, nor require such licensing.
DATED

this/~

day of December, 1977.
Respectfully submitted,
PARSONS & CROWTHER
B

~~rl,df!J

~S

H. CROWTHER

By~~~A
DAVID L. STOTT
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